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Manufacturing industries differ with respect to their energy intensity, labor-to-capital ratio and their
pollution intensity. Across the United States, there is significant variation in electricity prices and labor
and environmental regulation. This paper uses a regression discontinuity approach to examine whether
the basic logic of comparative advantage can explain the geographical clustering of U.S. manufacturing.
Using a unified empirical framework, we document that energy-intensive industries concentrate in
low electricity price counties, labor-intensive industries avoid pro-union counties, and pollution-intensive
industries locate in counties featuring relatively lax Clean Air Act regulation. We use our estimates
to predict the likely jobs impacts of regional carbon mitigation efforts.
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Over the last 50 years, manufacturing has migrated away from the U.S. Northeast and 
Midwest to the South and West and overseas (Crandall 1993). Between 1969 and 2000, Ohio’s 
total manufacturing employment fell by 380,000 and Pennsylvania lost over 650,000 
manufacturing jobs. Other states such as Nevada have experienced manufacturing job growth 
over time. Between 1997 and 2007, U.S. total manufacturing declined by 16% while Nevada’s 
manufacturing employment grew by 28%.
1 
Manufacturing firms face several tradeoffs in choosing where to locate. To reduce their 
cost of production, they would like to locate in areas featuring cheap land, low quality adjusted 
wages, lax regulatory requirements and cheap energy. They would also like to be close to final 
consumers and input suppliers in order to conserve on transportation costs. Some manufacturing 
firms will seek out areas where other firms in their own industry have already clustered to take 
advantage of agglomeration effects related to labor pooling and local learning (Dumais, Ellison 
and Glaeser 2002, Rosenthal and Strange 2004). 
Different manufacturing industries will have different rankings of the desirability of the 
same set of geographical areas. This paper studies the locational choice of heterogeneous 
manufacturing industries as they sort across diverse counties. We model each of these counties 
as embodying three key bundled attributes; its average industrial electricity price, its state’s labor 




We disaggregate manufacturing into 21 three-digit NAICS industries. We model each 
three-digit NAICS industry as a point in a three-dimensional attribute space; its labor-to-capital 
ratio, its energy consumption per unit of output, and its pollution intensity. Firms in these 
industries choose whether to locate in a United States county and conditional on locating there, 
how many workers to employ. 
The basic logic of comparative advantage yields several testable hypotheses. In a similar 
spirit as Ellison and Glaeser (1999), we test for the role of geographical “natural advantages” by 
studying the sorting patterns of diverse industries. Labor-intensive manufacturing should avoid 
pro-union counties. Energy-intensive industries should avoid high electricity price counties.
2 
Pollution-intensive industries should avoid counties that face strict Clean Air Act regulation. We 
use a county-industry level panel data set covering the years 1998 to 2006 to document evidence 
supporting all three of these claims. 
Our econometric approach employs a regression discontinuity strategy similar to Holmes 
(1998). We compare employment counts by manufacturing industry in adjacent counties. 
Adjacent counties share many common factors such as amenities and a common local labor 
market and similar access to final consumers but two adjacent counties can differ along key 
dimensions such as energy prices and exposure to government labor and environmental policy. 
We exploit this within county-pair variation in energy prices and labor and environmental 
regulation to provide new estimates of their effects on the locational pattern of manufacturing. 
                                                            
2 Energy-intensive industries will also attempt to avoid high oil, coal, and natural gas prices, as 
well. However, our identification strategy examines differences between neighboring counties 
and while there are regional differences in coal and natural gas, these differences are likely to be 
small between neighboring counties.  3 
 
Our study unifies three independent research lines investigating the geography of 
manufacturing employment activity. Carlton (1983) examined how location specific factors such 
as average metropolitan area wages and energy prices influenced firms’ locational choices. He 
studied where fabricated plastic products, communication transmitting equipment and electronic 
component factories located. He found that each of these industries were less likely to locate in 
metropolitan areas with higher electricity prices.   Deschenes (2010) uses a state level panel data 
approach and fails to reject the hypothesis that there is no correlation between changes in state 
manufacturing employment and changes in state electricity prices. For other broad industries 
such as agriculture, he finds evidence of a negative correlation. 
 A second literature has examined the unintended consequences of labor and 
environmental regulation in determining county manufacturing patterns. Such regulation is not 
uniformly imposed across the nation. Some states have Right-to-Work laws while others do not. 
Holmes (1998) uses a county border pair comparison design to document that manufacturing 
growth is taking place on the Right-to-Work (anti-union) side of the state border. In a similar 
spirit, an environmental literature has exploited cross-sectional and time series variation in the 
Clean Air Act’s regulatory intensity to test for whether high polluting industries seek out 
domestic pollution havens (counties not facing stringent Clean Air Act regulation). Becker and 
Henderson (1997), Kahn (1997) and Greenstone (2002) exploit temporal and spatial variation in 
Clean Air Act regulatory enforcement to document that environmental regulation deflects 
footloose, dirty manufacturing to less regulated areas.
3  Holmes’ study covers the years 1953 to 
1987 and Greenstone’s from 1967 to 1987. One payoff of our integrated approach which we use 
                                                            
3 Berman and Bui (2001a, 2001b) reject the hypothesis that stringent California regulation of oil 
refining led to local job destruction.  They use trends in oil refining employment in less regulated 
Texas as a control group.   4 
 
to study manufacturing over the years 1998 to 2006 is to test whether both of the forces that they 
document are still at work in the more recent period. 
A third empirical literature has sought to understand why certain industries agglomerate 
close together (Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser 2002, Rosenthal and Strange 2003, 2004). Labor 
pooling and knowledge spillovers are important agglomeration sources. This literature yields 
insights into predicting which industries will cluster together but does not offer precise 
predictions over where these clusters will take place. Historical circumstances offer one possible 
initial condition (Krugman 1991). A location’s input prices and regulatory stringency offer an 
alternative pathway for explaining where manufacturing clusters form. If there are significant 
agglomeration economies for such industries then self re-enforcing clusters will arise in counties 
offering an economic environment that allows specific industries to economize on expenditure 
for inputs that they use intensively. 
By generating new estimates of the role of electricity prices on the locational choice of 21 
U.S. manufacturing industries, we take a new look at the likely consequences of regional and 
state level efforts (such as California’s AB32) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
4  In the 
summer of 2010 the Senate decided to table legislation that would have introduced a carbon cap 
and trade bill for electric utilities. Opponents of the bill argued that it would be a jobs killer for 
coal states, as electricity prices would rise in such states (due to tax pass through). They argued 
that this electricity price increase would deflect manufacturing jobs to states with cheaper 
electricity.  We use our estimates to judge the merits of this claim by simulating the job loss for 





We will compare manufacturing activity in adjacent counties. In most of the econometric 
results we present below, we will limit our study to counties that lie within metropolitan areas. 
More than 75% of the nation’s jobs are located in the 781 counties that lie within a metropolitan 
area. Given that our main econometric strategy relies on contrasting border-pairs of counties, we 
would ideally like these counties to be “twins”. Our rationale for mainly focusing on 
metropolitan area counties is to avoid comparing manufacturing job counts in adjacent rural 
counties or in two counties for which one is located within a metropolitan area and its adjacent 
neighbor is not. We recognize that some might view this sample restriction as arbitrary and so 
we will also report results that use the full sample of all U.S. counties. 
Our empirical work’s unit of analysis will be a county/industry/year. We will study the 
spatial sorting patterns and the employment decisions of 21 manufacturing industries using the 
U.S. County Business Patterns data over the years 1998 to 2006.
5 Throughout this paper, we 
assume that each of these industries differ with respect to their production process (and hence in 
their response to electricity prices and regulation) but any two firms within the same industry 
have the same production function.
6   
                                                            
5 County Business Patterns (http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/download/index.htm).  We use 
1998 as our start date because this was the first year in which NAICS rather than SIC codes 
where used. 
6 If there is within industry plant level heterogeneity, then there would be two types of selection 
effects.   Individual plants would simultaneously choose where to locate (the first selection 
effect), and then would make choices over what technology to adopt as a function of local input 
prices.  In high energy price areas, such firms would be more likely to invest in energy efficient 
capital.  This choice’s impact on employment would hinge on whether workers and capital are 
complements or substitutes.   6 
 
Each firm simultaneously chooses which county to locate in, how much output to 
produce, and its input choice.  The firms choose their optimal location with full knowledge of 
their underlying production technology.  In contrast, the econometrician does not know whether, 
for a specific industry, energy and labor are complements or substitutes. If they are substitutes, 
then industries located in high energy price counties may hire more workers.   A county’s input 
prices and regulatory structure induce both a selection effect (whether the firm locates there) and 
a treatment effect (how the representative firm within each industry responds to the local input 
prices). Our empirical work seeks to measure this combined effect.  We will also study industry 
entry decisions (the selection effect) as a function of a geographical location’s regulatory policies 
and its electricity prices.  
For every county in a metropolitan area, we identify pairs of counties that are adjacent. A 
given county such as Cook County in Illinois can touch several counties and thus will be a 
member of several border pairs. Below, we will discuss our weighting scheme. 
Our main econometric model is presented in equation (1). The unit of analysis is by 
county i, county-pair j, industry k, and year t. County i is located in utility u and state s. 
               
            
                                                         ,          (1) 
In this regression, the dependent variable will be a measure of county/industry/year 
employment. The first term on the right side of equation (1) presents the log of the average 
electricity prices that the industry faces in a specific county. The second term allows this price 
effect to vary with the industry’s electricity-intensity index. The third term represents an 
interaction term between whether state s is a Right-to-Work state and the industry’s labor-to-
capital ratio. In the regressions, the electricity-intensity index is normalized to range from 0 to 1 7 
 
for ease in interpreting the results. In equation (1), Z is a vector of a county's population in 1970, 
its distance to the nearest metropolitan area's Central Business District (CBD), the county's land 
area, and the log of the 1990 housing values.
7 In the core specifications we control for a county-
pair fixed effect, industry-year fixed effects and state fixed effects. We rely heavily on these 
border pair fixed effects to soak up spatial variation in local labor market conditions, climate 
amenities, and proximity to intermediate input providers and final customers. Given widespread 
car ownership, adjacent counties represent an integrated local labor market in which workers can 
access many possible job opportunities. Past studies such as Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser (2002) 
have emphasized the importance of labor pooling as an explanation for why firms in the same 
industry locate close together. The industry/year fixed effects control for any macro level 
changes in demand due to shifting national consumption trends or world trade.
8 The state fixed 
effects control for any time invariant state policy that affects a firm’s propensity to locate within 
a state.
9 For example, some states have low taxes such as Missouri while others such as 
California do not. 
                                                            
7 We recognize that adjacent counties are unlikely to be perfect “twins.”  The classic 
monocentric model of urban economics predicts that counties closer to a major Central Business 
District will feature higher population densities and higher land prices than more suburban 
counties.    We have also estimated specifications that included other county attributes such as a 
dummy indicating whether the county is the metropolitan area’s center county and another 
dummy that indicates whether the county is adjacent to an Ocean or a Great Lake. The results are 
robust to controlling for these variables and are available on request. 
8 Linn (2009) documents that linkages between manufacturing industries amplify the effect of a 
macro energy price shock.  Given that energy-intensive industries are important input suppliers 
to other industries, there could be industry-year effects driven by such linkages.  Including the 
industry-year fixed effects helps to address this issue.  For more on the macroeconomics impacts 
of energy price changes see Killian (2008). 
9 Below, we will report results with and without state fixed effects. 8 
 
We use several different dependent variables. We begin by examining the number of 
manufacturing employees. We will also present results that simply focus on industry k in county 
i in year t’s percent of total county employment. In another specification, we will report results 
for log(employment) which is estimated only for county/industry/year observations for who there 
is positive employment count.  As we discuss below, roughly 50% of our observations at the 
county/industry/year level equal zero.  We also examine log(1+employment) as the dependent 
variable. This dependent variable allows us to capture the total effect of entry, exit and plant 
growth and shrinkage. Finally, we will also present results in which dependent variable equals 
one if there is any employment in a given county in a given industry/year. 
Estimates of equation (1) generate new findings about the long run equilibrium 
relationship between regulation, electricity prices and manufacturing locational choice. As we 
discuss below, county electricity prices are very highly serially correlated over time and so is 
labor and environmental regulation. Thus, these three factors embody long run natural 
advantages of a specific location.  
Within each local labor markets, we will study where the 21 different manufacturing 
industries clusters. While labor pooling represents an important reason why firms will cluster 
within local commuting range (say within fifteen miles), it alone does not explain where the 
cluster will take place. We posit that long run differentials in input prices and regulations 
influence where specific industries cluster.
10 
                                                            
10 Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) argue that for advertising that the agglomeration benefits (as 
measured by average productivity) are a function of highly localized agglomeration (the count of 
firms within one mile of a specific firm).  Rosenthal and Strange (2003) find that for firms in the 
computer software, apparel, food processing, printing and publishing, machinery, and fabricated 
metals industries that firms are agglomerating within the same zip code. 9 
 
The 21 industries differ with respect to their energy intensity, labor-to-capital ratio and 
their pollution intensity. These three dimensions of industry heterogeneity are often bundled 
together. Copeland and Taylor (2004) argue that pollution-intensive industries tend to be capital 
intensive. This suggests that there will be a negative correlation between labor intensity and 
pollution intensity. Industry pollution intensity is likely to be correlated with an industry’s 
energy intensity. Our econometric framework presented in equation (1) explicitly acknowledges 
this through adopting a multivariate regression framework. Our data source is the NBER 
Productivity Data Base from 1997 to 2005.
11 
The interaction terms presented in equation (1) allow us to test three hypotheses.  The 
first hypothesis is that labor-intensive industries cluster on the Right-to-Work Side of the border.  
The second hypothesis is that energy-intensive industries cluster on the low electricity price side 
of the border.  The third hypothesis is that high emissions industries cluster in the low 
environmental regulation side of the border. 
The key identifying assumption in this paper is that there exists within county border pair 
variation in labor regulation intensity, electricity prices, and Clean Air Act intensity that allows 
us to observe “exogenous” variation. We can only test for the role of factors that vary within the 
border pair. We first explain why there is variation in each of our key explanatory variables 








Electricity prices vary across electric utility jurisdictions (see Figure 1 for county average 
prices in 1998). Adjacent counties can lie within different electric utility jurisdictions. Each of 
the approximately 460 U.S. electric utilities charges different electricity prices. In the ideal 
research design that relies on county-level employment data, each county would be served by 
one utility. In this case, we would have a sharp spatial regression discontinuity at each county 
border but this is not the case. Some major counties have multiple utilities. While other utilities 
span several counties. If two adjacent counties lie within the same electric utility district, then 
there will be no within border pair variation for these counties.
12 
Most of our border pairs are within the same utility area. However, for those pairs that 
cross utilities, the price differences can be significant. The median price differential is about one 
cent for border pair counties that lie in different utility areas. For five percent of these counties, 
the difference is over 9 cents a kWh. For firms in electricity intensive industries, this differential 
represents about 7% of revenue.  This fact highlights that there are significant cost savings for a 
subset of industries for choosing to locate in the lower electricity price county within a pair. 
                                                            
12 Davis et al. (2008) find that, in 2000, about 60 percent of the variation in electricity prices paid 
by manufacturing plants can be explained by county fixed effects. The remaining differences 
may be due to multiple utilities serving a county, non-linear pricing where customers are charged 
both a usage fee and a peak consumption fee, or because of different rates negotiated with the 
utilities. Davis et al. find evidence of scale economies in delivery that are consistent with 
observed quantity discounts. 11 
 
Most U.S. retail electricity prices are determined through rate hearings where regulated 
firms can recover rates through average cost pricing. Initially in restructured markets, rates were 
frozen for an initial period when utilities were to recover “stranded” assets. Today the retail 
prices in these markets are mostly wholesale costs as passed on to consumers through retail 
competition. However, during our historic period, most rates were the function of past costs that 
had little to do with current production costs. 
Our electricity price data are constructed from data available from the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) form 861.
13 We determine prices by aggregating total revenue 
at any utility that serves industrial customers in a given county and year. We divide this total 
revenue by the total quantity of electricity sold by those utilities in that year. In fact, industrial 
customers face a non-linear structure that has a per day fixed meter charge, an energy charge per 
kWh consumed, and an additional demand charge based on peak hourly consumption (kW) 
during a billing period. In addition, rates may differ by firm size and type. Some large firms face 
tariffs with a specific tariff that applies to them. Below, we will discuss how we attempt to 
address this issue.  We recognize that our empirical strategy imposes that firms respond to cross 
county average price variation when in fact firms will recognize that they face a non-linear 
pricing schedule. 
3.2.   Labor Regulation  
We follow Holmes (1998) and assign each county to whether it is located in a Right-to-
Work state or not. Today, there are 22 states that are Right-to-Work states. A Right-to-Work law 




support a union. The set of states includes Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. 
When we restrict our sample to the set of counties that are both in a metropolitan area, we 
have relatively few cases in which one county lies in a Right-to-Work state and the other county 
lies in non-Right-to-Work State. Two examples of such a “hybrid” metropolitan areas are Kansas 
City, Missouri and Washington DC. Below, we will also report results in which we use all U.S. 
counties. 
3.3.   Environmental Regulation  
The Clean Air Act assigns counties to low regulation (Attainment Status) and high 
regulation (Non-Attainment Status) based on past ambient air pollution readings.  Within county 
border-pairs, there is variation in environmental regulation both due to cross-sectional 
differences (i.e., high regulated counties that are adjacent to less regulated cleaner counties) and 
due to changes over time (reclassification of counties from attainment to non-attainment and 
vice-versa). In 1998, there were from 80 non-attainment counties while, in 2006, 51 remained.
14     
We take our 21 industries and, based on Greenstone’s (2002) Table A2, we assign four 
industries (wood products, paper, nonmetallic minerals, and primary metals) to “High particulate 
matter polluters.” We hypothesize that these industries should be the most responsive to avoiding 
                                                            
14 In an earlier draft of this paper , we estimated the same regressions we will present below but 
we measured local environmental regulation intensity using a county’s carbon monoxide non-
attainment status.  We find qualitatively similar results.   The reason we dropped the carbon 
monoxide investigation is because in recent years only a small set of counties (10) are still in 
non-attainment status.   Recent progress in reducing ambient carbon monoxide has led to the 
reclassification of many counties from “non-attainment” to “attainment” status.  13 
 
the non-attainment sides of the county border pair and in locating in that county within the 
county border pair that does not monitor ambient particulate matter.
15   The data indicating a 
county’s Clean Air Act regulatory status are from the EPA's Greenbook.
16 Our county/year 
ambient air pollution data are from the U.S. EPA AIRS data base.   
4. Econometric Details 
We estimate equation (1) using OLS and two stage least squares. We recognize that there 
are cases in which the county's average electricity price could be correlated with the error term. 
A demand side explanation argues that a boom in local employment will result in an increase in 
the utility's demand. This requires more expensive power plants to operate, and electricity prices 
will increase. Second, industrial firms have some bargaining power in negotiating rates with the 
electric utility.  Third, imprecise measurement of a firm's electricity price will attenuate OLS 
coefficient estimates. For these reasons, we instrument using average electricity prices for 
commercial customers in that county-year. In the footnotes of the tables below, we will report 
the F-statistic for the instruments. We do not instrument for labor regulation or environmental 
regulation.  Recall that the labor regulation varies by state not by county. Thus, under the 
assumption that each county is "small" within a state, it will take the state's regulation as given. 
In the case of environmental regulation, we will present results where we control for a 
polynomial of the county's ambient air pollution. We recognize the possibility that counties with 
more pollution have more industrial activity and are thus more likely to be in non-attainment. By 
                                                            
15 Ambient air pollution is not monitored in every county. Kahn (1997) documents higher manufacturing growth 
rates in counties that do not monitor ambient pollution relative to those that do.  
16 http://epa.gov/airquality/greenbk/ 14 
 
including this potentially omitted continuous variable (ambient pollution), we are exploiting a 
regression discontinuity design to test for the discrete effect of the regulation. 
Note that because each county-industry-year observation enters multiple times (since a 
county can be adjacent to several counties), we need to cluster at this, or a more aggregate, level. 
The error term in equation (1) is clustered by utility and year, which is the level we observe 
electricity prices. We weight our regressions by the inverse of the number of times a county-
industry-year observation enters the sample so as to avoid having counties with more neighbors 
be weighted more so than others. 
In addition to estimating OLS and IV estimates of equation (1), we also report estimates 
of a long differenced version of equation (1). This specification implicitly allows for county 
fixed effects and estimates the impact of electricity prices using within county variation: 
∆      
              
    ∆   
         ∆   
                                ,           (2) 
where               is the average employment in 1998 and 2006.  Using a plant level panel data set, 
this is Greenstone’s (2002) dependent variable. Such variation is generated because of changes in 
fuel prices (either via rate hearings or retail competition) or rate freezes implemented with the 
start of restructuring. We predict that any employment change responses to such electricity price 
changes should be smaller than long run effects. 
Finally, we estimate a model that does not use a regression discontinuity framework. In 
equation (3), the unit of analysis is by county i, industry k, and year t. We estimate equation (3) 
with industry-year fixed effects and either county (as shown here) or state fixed effects. 
              
            
                                            .          (3) 15 
 
5. Results 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics. The uneven distribution of manufacturing activity 
is revealed in the first row. The average county/industry/year observation has 642 jobs but the 
median is 0 and the maximum is 158,573. It is relevant to note these summary statistics are based 
on all counties located in metropolitan areas and excludes about 75% of U.S. counties. Of this 
sample, 49% have at least one employee in that county, industry, and year. 
Table 2 reports the names and key statistics for the 21 manufacturing industries that we 
study. The rows are sorted from the most energy-intensive industry (Primary Metals) to the least 
energy-intensive industry (Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing). The most energy-
intensive industry uses sixteen times as much electricity per unit of output as the least electricity-
intensive industry. In the right column of Table 2, we report each industry’s labor-to-capital 
ratio. Apparel, Leather, Textiles, and Furniture are some of the most labor-intensive industries. 
In contrast, the primary metals industry has a tiny labor-to-capital ratio. The cross-industry 
correlation between the electricity index and the labor-to-capital ratio equals -.36. 
In Table 3, we report our first estimates of equation (1). Recall that each county pair 
consists of two metropolitan area counties that are physically adjacent. Controlling for county-
pair fixed effects, industry-year fixed effects, and state fixed effects, and a vector of fixed county 
attributes (log of land area, log of the distance to the closest metro area’s Central Business 
District, the log of the county’s 1970 population, and the log of the 1990 housing values), we 
focus on the role of electricity prices and labor regulation in determining manufacturing 16 
 
clusters.
17 As shown in column (1), we find evidence of a negative relationship between 
electricity prices and manufacturing employment activity for all manufacturing industries whose 
normalized electricity index is greater than .15. For 11 industries (those with low electricity 
indices), we find a positive correlation between electricity prices and manufacturing activity.
18 
We find the largest negative effects of electricity prices on primary metals employment. For this 
industry, we estimate a price elasticity of -3.3.
19  
Controlling for electricity prices, we find that labor-intensive manufacturing clusters on 
the Right-to-Work side of the county border pair. For the most labor-intensive industry 
(Apparel), the coefficients imply 308 more jobs on the right-to-work side of the boarder, relative 
to an extremely capital-intensive industry like petroleum. It is relevant to contrast this finding 
with Holmes’ (1998) work. He interpreted the Right-to-Work status of a state as indicating the 
state’s general “pro-business” viewpoint. He did not disaggregate manufacturing into distinct 
industries. If the Right-to-Work status simply reflected this overall ideology then we might not 
observe that labor-intensive industries are more likely to cluster there. Our finding of a positive 
industry-average labor intensity interaction with the state’s labor policies indicates a differential 
                                                            
17 For the first column, when we look at the level of manufacturing employment, we use the level 
of population in 1970 to be consistent. The results are similar when log historic population is 
used instead. 
18 Deschenes (2010) uses a state/year panel approach using a longer time series than we do and 
does not disaggregate manufacturing industries beyond; “durables” and “non-durables.”  
Controlling for state and year fixed effects, for “non-durables” he reports a positive correlation 
of electricity prices and employment based on a specification with state and year fixed effects. 
19 This is the sum of the coefficient on price and the coefficient on price interacted with the index 
(which is normalized to range from 0 to 1, where 1 is the most electricity-intensive industry 
(primary metals)) all divided by the average employment in that industry in our sample: (237+(-
1551)*1)/398=-3.3. 17 
 
effect within manufacturing. The other covariates in the regression indicate that there are more 
manufacturing jobs in counties with larger year 1970 population levels and in counties with more 
land area. Counties further from the city center have more manufacturing jobs, though this is 
significant only in Columns (2), (3), and (4).
20 
The results in column (2) of Table 3 switch the dependent variable to the ratio of a 
county/year’s jobs in a given industry divided by total county employment. This was Holmes’ 
(1998) dependent variable. This measure better captures the composition of jobs within a county. 
The results are quite similar to the results in column (1). For the primary metals industry, we find 
that a 10% increase in electricity prices is associated with a 2.5 percentage point reduction in the 
share of workers in the county who works in this industry. Columns (3) and (4) model 
log(manufacturing) and log(1+manufacturing). The results imply an electricity price elasticity 
for the most electricity-intensive industry of approximately -.85 and -.64, respectively. In column 
(5), we focus on the extensive margin using a dummy dependent variable that equals one if the 
county has any employment in a given industry/year. Our results indicate that a 10% increase in 
electricity prices is associated with a .5 percentage point reduction in the probability that a 
county has a primary metals plant opening. For labor-intensive industries, such births are more 
likely on the Right-to-Work side of the border.
21 
                                                            
20 Recall that all of the counties in this regression are located within metropolitan areas. Given 
the cost per square foot of center city land, it is intuitive that land-intensive manufacturing 
activity will take place where land is relatively cheap within a metropolitan area.  After all, 
manufacturing cannot be sited in a skyscraper. 
21 Recognizing that within a county such as Los Angeles County firms may seek out the cheapest 
utility within the county, we have re-estimated our models using the minimum price in the 
county and find very similar results. 18 
 
We recognize that our estimates of equation (1) are subject to the criticism that there are 
fixed county attributes that are not captured by our controls that could be correlated with the key 
explanatory variables.  If these unobservables are time invariant, then first differencing removes 
these effects. In column (6) of Table 3, we report estimates of equation (2). This long differenced 
regression is of the change from 1998 to 2006 in county/industry employment divided by the 
average employment in those years.
22 Since the set of states that are Right-to-Work states does 
not change over time, we lose the ability to estimate this effect. By including county fixed 
effects, we exploit 1998 to 2006 variation in county average electricity prices. Intuitively, we are 
comparing pairs of counties where one county has experienced a larger percent change over time 
in the price of electricity than its adjacent “twin.” We view this within county estimate as 
capturing the short run effects of energy price changes and we find that for primary metals an 
elasticity of -.34 which is about half the magnitude of the “long run” elasticities reported in 
columns (3) and (4). For industries whose normalized energy intensity is less than .85, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that there is no relationship between changes in electricity prices and 
changes in county employment at the 10 percent level. As shown in Table 2, all industries but 
Paper and Primary Metals fall into this category. 
In the results in Table 3, we simultaneously study the role of labor regulation and 
electricity prices.   In results available on request, we have also estimated the regressions and 
studied the role of each of these agglomeration factors on their own.  The results indicate that 
both the absolute magnitude of the electricity price effects and the labor regulation effects are 
smaller when we study them separately versus jointly (the coefficients are about 80% of the size 
                                                            
22 Greenstone (2002) uses this functional form in studying manufacturing firms. For his sample, 
he finds that this functional form implies similar elasticities as logs for firms that exist 
throughout. However, this functional form allows him, and us, to study births and deaths. 19 
 
as compared to the main results). These results highlight the importance of simultaneously 
studying all of the agglomeration forces within a unified framework. 
We recognize that in estimating equation (1) in the pooled specification that we have 
restricted the county pair fixed effects to be the same for each of the 21 three-digit NAICS 
industries. In reality, different industries are likely to have different rankings of the desirability 
of different county pair locations. Such industries will differ with regards to where their final 
consumers are and which geographical areas offer the greatest spillover opportunities. In Table 
4, we stratify our estimates of equation (1) and estimate separate regressions by industry using 
three functional forms for employment (N): N, percent total employment, and ln(N). For some 
energy-intensive industries such as primary metals we find a large negative elasticity ranging 
from -.94 to -2.65, depending on functional form, while less energy-intensive industries such as 
printing manufacturing we find a zero price elasticity. The industries that have a large energy-
intensity index and for which we find a relatively large price elasticity (the coefficient on ln(N) is 
greater in magnitude than .5) include: Primary Metals, Petroleum, Textile Mills, and Wood 
Products. Other electricity-intensive industries include Paper, Nonmetallic Minerals, Chemicals, 
and Plastics which were not as sensitive to electricity prices. To our surprise, we estimate some 
large negative price elasticities for Transportation Equipment, which is not electricity intensive. 
As shown in Table 4, these industry-stratified results are robust for over half of industries if we 
use employment, the percent of total employees, or the log of employment as the dependent 
variable. However, for some industries, we do find that the functional form of employment 
implies different signs that are significantly different from zero.
23 
                                                            
23 These industries are NAICS 312, 314, 316, 322, 332, and 335. 20 
 
We now turn to studying how county-level environmental regulatory severity affects the 
location of manufacturing clusters. Table 5 explores this for manufacturing employment counts 
while Appendix Tables A1 and A2 show the results for percent total employment and log 
manufacturing employment, respectively. We report estimates of equation (1) with measures 
related to particulate matter (PM) regulation and a cubic of ambient pollution levels.
24 As shown 
in the first column of Table 5, controlling for ambient PM and environmental regulation has very 
little effect on the electricity price or labor regulation findings. 
Holding county electricity prices and labor regulation constant, we test whether high PM 
emitting industries respond to county PM regulation status. As shown in Table 5’s column (1), 
we find that counties assigned to non-attainment status have 276 more workers in relatively clean 
industries, but 426 fewer workers than an adjacent county twin who is in attainment status for the 
four industries that have high PM emissions.  In adjacent counties where particulate matter is not  
monitored in one county but is monitored in the other, there are 250 more dirty jobs in the county 
where particulate matter is not monitored. This is consistent with Kahn’s (1997) finding that 
there has been greater manufacturing growth in counties not monitoring air pollution. 
From Table 5, we can compare the relative sensitivities of a given industry to energy 
prices, labor policy, and environmental policies. For an industry like primary metals—which is 
energy intensive, capital intensive, and a high PM polluter—banning Right-to-Work laws would 
have the same effect on employment as a 3.8 percent increase in electricity prices. In contrast, if 
                                                            
24 Counties are more likely to be assigned to non-attainment status if their ambient air pollution 
levels in the recent past have been higher.   If booming counties have high regulation levels, then 
a researcher could conclude that regulation raises employment levels when in fact reverse 
causality is generating this relationship.  To sidestep this problem, we include a cubic of the 
county’s ambient carbon monoxide level. 21 
 
a primary metal manufacturer’s county falls into non-attainment with environmental regulations, 
this is akin to increasing electricity prices by 34 percent. For other industries that are less energy 
intensive but still polluting, like wood products, labor and environmental regulations are much 
more costly: these policies would reduce employment to the same degree as increasing electricity 
prices 118 and 256 percent, respectively. Other industries that are not energy or pollution 
intensive are not negatively affected by either higher energy prices or pollution regulation. 
The take away theme here is one of comparative advantage. The most energy-intensive 
industries respond to electricity prices and the most labor-intensive industries respond to labor 
regulation and the most pollution-intensive industries respond to environmental regulatory 
differentials. 
Up until this point, we focused on results based on counties located in metropolitan areas. 
In the column (2) of Table 5, we re-estimate equation (1) using the full sample of all U.S. 
counties.  Relative to the metro sample, the results for the full county sample yield the same 
coefficient signs but the absolute value of the coefficients shrinks by roughly 50%.  
We recognize that our county-pair regression discontinuity estimation strategy is a non-
standard approach. In columns (3) and (4) in Table 5, we re-estimate equation (1) but we drop 
the county-pair RD framework. Note the number of observations declines. In this case, we only 
have one observation per county/industry/year. In column (4), we estimate equation (3) using 
county fixed effects and in column (4) we estimate equation (3) controlling for state fixed 
effects. Perhaps surprisingly, these fixed effects results are almost identical to the RD results 
presented in column (1). This similarity in coefficient estimates suggests that the effects across a 
relatively short time period within a county are similar to differences across county pairs. 22 
 
Furthermore, the similarity between columns (3) and (4) suggests that within state differences in 
counties are uncorrelated with our variables of interest.
25 
We now present results similar to Table 3 in which we estimate equation (1) using two 
stage least squares. The two stage least squares results are reported in Table 6. The first stage of 
TSLS highlights that commercial electricity prices are unit elastic and are strong instruments (F-
stat of 165). As shown in columns (1) through (5), we find similar qualitative results as for OLS 
but the elasticities are slightly smaller. 
6. Predicting Local Manufacturing Job Destruction Due to Carbon Pricing 
Pass Through  
In the summer of 2010, the U.S. Senate chose not to vote on carbon cap-and-trade 
regulation. Fear of job loss in coal states facing a carbon price helped to kill the bill.  Opponents 
of carbon regulation argued that an unintended consequence of carbon mitigation regulation 
would be significant “leakage” of industrial activity to nearby states that will be less affected by 
cap and trade legislation.
26    For such “leakage” to take place, the following logic chain must 
hold.  Carbon pricing must raise electricity prices by different amounts in different states with 
the largest electricity price increases taking place in states that rely on coal for generating power.  
In addition, manufacturing must be fairly “footloose” in how it responds to electricity price 
differentials across space. 
                                                            
25 In results that are available on request, we have conducted a variety of robustness tests.  The 
results we report in Table 3’s column (1) are robust to controlling for local labor market demand. 
26 Deschenes (2010) uses his state level panel estimates to predict the likely employment effects 
of a Federal carbon mitigation policy. If such a policy would raise electricity prices by 4%, then 
he predicts that aggregate U.S. employment would decline by 460,000. 23 
 
Our estimates are useful for judging the validity of this concern. First, we estimate the 
marginal carbon dioxide emissions in each electricity market. As in Holland and Mansur (2008), 
we define markets as NERC regions (during the late 1990s and early 2000s). For the years 1997 
to 2000, we use data from EPA’s Continuous Emissions Monitoring System on hourly power 
plant emissions and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Form 714 data on 
hourly electricity consumption by utility. For each NERC region, we regress hourly aggregate 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions on hourly aggregate demand, and fixed effects for month-year 
and hour-of-day. Standard errors are clustered by month-year. The coefficient of interest 
measures the marginal change in emissions rate (tons of CO2 per MWh). Panel A of Table 7 
reports the coefficient estimates and standard errors. Average emissions rates are also shown for 
comparison.  For a given carbon price, we can predict the change in electricity prices assuming 
complete pass through and no change in the merit order of power plants (i.e., the same power 
plant would be on the margin with and without a carbon price).  
The thought experiment we run is to introduce a $15 per ton carbon tax for each regional 
electricity market (e.g., a NERC) region under the assumption that it is the only region to enact 
this policy.  We then summarize the effects on employment at the state level.  In Table 7, we 
report simulations based on our main results in Table 3, column (1).  For each state, Panel B 
reports total change in manufacturing jobs, the average normalized electricity index, and the 
average change in electricity prices. The states that are expected to be the most affected are Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, New York, and North Carolina. We caution against summing our individual state 
job loss estimates to yield a national job loss estimate because we cannot claim to have credibly 
recovered estimates that can be used in a general equilibrium context.  24 
 
7. Conclusion 
The basic logic of cost minimization offers strong predictions concerning where different 
manufacturing industries will cluster across U.S. counties as a function of local policies and 
input prices. Using a unified framework that exploits within county-pair variation in locational 
attributes, we have documented that labor-intensive industries locate in anti-union areas, energy-
intensive industries locate in low electricity price counties and high polluting industries seek out 
low regulation areas. Based on our findings, we conclude that energy prices are only a significant 
determinant of locational choice for a handful of manufacturing industries such as primary 
metals. For the typical manufacturing industry, the electricity price effects are modest.   Our 
analysis highlights the importance of simultaneously studying multiple determinants of industrial 
agglomeration.     
  Our estimates of the relationship between local manufacturing employment and local 
electricity prices can be used to simulate the consequences of a new local carbon mitigation 
policy such as a carbon tax. A Republican dominated Congress is highly unlikely to enact 
Federal carbon legislation but state and regional initiatives such as California’s AB32 and the 
Northeast’s RGGI are moving forward.  Based on our estimates from calendar year 2006, we 
predict that the introduction of a $15 per ton cap and trade program in California under AB32 
would lead to a loss of two thousand jobs for this state (a .1% reduction).  The introduction of a 
$15 per ton of carbon dioxide policy in the RGGI region (ten Northeastern states) would lead to 
a loss of 15 thousand jobs in that region (a 1.1% reduction).
27  This price is only a benchmark: 
we recognize that actual permit prices may be very different and that carbon policies may 
                                                            
27 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative regulates firms in Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont. 25 
 
include other incentives that will affect employment.    The RGGI region’s greater percentage 
differential is due to the fact that this region’s electric utilities have a higher carbon emissions 
factor and its industries are on average more energy intensive than California’s.  While many 
studies examining the costs of carbon mitigation regulation rely on computable general 
equilibrium models to forecast consequences, we believe that combining econometric evidence 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
1st 3rd
Variable Units  Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Quartile Median Quartile Max
    
Mnfct. Employees  workers  138,264 642 2,485 0  0 0 463 158,573
   
% Total Emp.  138,264 0.5% 1.4% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 56.4%
   
ln(N) %  67,818 6.15 1.44 0.00  5.17 6.17 7.13 11.97
   
Any Manufacturing  0/1  138,264 0.49 0.50 0.00  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
   
Electricity Price  $/kWh  138,264 $0.064 $0.023 $0.025  $0.050 $0.056 $0.068 $0.296
   
Electricity Index  kWh/shipments  138,264 0.27 0.25 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.39 1.00
   
Elect. Cost Share  elec. cost/ship.  189 0.014 0.013 0.002 0.008 0.012 0.025 0.056
   
Right-to-Work Law  0/1  138,264 0.43 0.50 0.00  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
   
Labor/Capital Ratio 
work 
hrs/capital  138,264 0.017 0.013 0.001 0.007 0.014 0.023 0.074
   
Local Demand 
%Δtotal 
emp 138,264 1.7% 5.2% -53.8%  -0.5% 1.7% 3.9% 98.5%
   
1970 Population  in 1000s  138,264 209.3 437.0 2.4  39.2 88.6 215.1 7042.8
   
Miles to CBD  miles  138,264 18.21 19.81 2.28  6.73 13.39 22.75 181.91
   
Area of County  sq. miles  138,264 841 1,379 15  395 561 816 20,053




Table 2: Industry Details 
Normalized 
Electricity Electricity  Labor  to 
Industry NAICS  Index  Index  Capital  Ratio 
Primary Metal Manufacturing  331  0.816  1.000  0.007 
Paper Manufacturing  322  0.706  0.856  0.006 
Textile Mills  313  0.503  0.591  0.014 
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing  327  0.454  0.527  0.013 
Chemical Manufacturing  325  0.402  0.459  0.004 
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing  326  0.330  0.364  0.016 
Wood Product Manufacturing  321  0.253  0.265  0.028 
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing  324  0.245  0.254  0.002 
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing  332  0.185  0.175  0.020 
Printing and Related Support Activities  323  0.169  0.154  0.023 
Textile Product Mills  314  0.165  0.149  0.035 
Food Manufacturing  311  0.149  0.128  0.013 
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and 
Component Manufacturing  335  0.137  0.112  0.017 
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing  337  0.123  0.094  0.043 
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing  316  0.110  0.077  0.035 
Machinery Manufacturing  333  0.103  0.068  0.014 
Apparel Manufacturing  315  0.102  0.067  0.047 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing  339  0.096  0.059  0.023 
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 312  0.092 0.053  0.004 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing  336  0.086  0.045  0.011 
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing  334  0.051  0.000  0.007 
Correlation with Electricity Index  -0.356 




Notes: Industries are defined by 3 digit NAICS codes. 
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Table 3: Effect of Electricity Prices on Manufacturing Employment using a Regression Discontinuity Approach 
N 
Manufacturing Percent  Long 
Employees 
Total 
Employment  ln N  ln (N+1)  Any N  Difference 
1     2     3     4     5     6    
ln Electricity Price  236.9  ***  0.109 ***  0.26 ***  0.15 **  0.006  0.04 
 (58.1)  (0.021)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.011)  (0.17) 
ln Price * Electricity Index  -1550.6  ***  -0.361 ***  -1.11 ***  -0.79 ***  -0.056 **  -0.38 * 
 (212.2)  (0.060)  (0.08)  (0.18)  (0.028)  (0.20) 
Right  to  Work*  Labor/Capital  6708.7 ***  6.941 ***  2.25  16.93 ***  2.76 *** 
 (1002.0)  (1.118)  (1.41)  (1.49)  (0.22) 
Population in 1970 (in 1000s)  2.83  *** 
(0.13) 
ln Population in 1970  0.015  ***  0.74  ***  1.32  ***  0.15  *** 
 (0.005)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
ln Miles to CBD  23.9  0.061  ***  0.02  *  0.03  -0.01  *** 
(36.5) (0.008)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
ln Area of County (Sq. Miles)  281.9 ***  0.035 ***  0.16 ***  0.31 ***  0.05 *** 
(38.4) (0.007)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.00) 
Ln Housing Values in 1990  952.5  ***  -0.222  ***  0.39  ***  0.99  ***  0.14  *** 
(74.2) (0.019)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
                  
County Pair F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry-Year F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                  
R
2 0.36  0.17  0.53  0.58  0.50  0.14 
n  850,458     850,017     428,502     850,458     850,458     53,482    
 
* Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors clustered by utility-year. For the long difference, the dependent variable is the change 
in employment from 1998 to 2006 divided by the average employment in those years, and the electricity prices are the change in the log prices. The omitted category is a county in 
a non-Right to Work county.  32 
 
Table 4: Employment Regressions by Industry 
Normalized   
Electricity Average Average  Coef on  Coef on %  Coef on 
Industry  Index  Employment  % Tot Emp  N     Total Emp     ln N    
Primary Metal Manufacturing  1.00                 398   0.39  -1052.6  ***  -0.368  ***  -1.18  *** 
     (125.1) (0.074)  (0.09) 
Paper Manufacturing  0.86                 381   0.29  -741.0  ***  0.109  ***  -0.35  *** 
     (111.9) (0.037)  (0.06) 
Textile Mills  0.59                 151   0.23  -1006.2  ***  -0.199  **  -0.78  ** 
     (135.3) (0.077)  (0.31) 
Nonmetallic Mineral Product 
Manufacturing 
0.53                 431   0.52  -737.2  ***  -0.145  ***  -0.24  *** 
   (106.8) (0.047)  (0.06) 
Chemical Manufacturing  0.46                 787   0.62  169.9  0.250  ***  0.19  ** 
     (135.8) (0.096)  (0.09) 
Plastics and Rubber Products 
Manufacturing 
0.36                 847   0.88  -88.7  -0.093  -0.19  *** 
   (78.9) (0.059)  (0.06) 
Wood Product Manufacturing  0.26                 296   0.46  -1041.1  ***  -0.197  ***  -0.54  *** 
     (127.8) (0.051)  (0.10) 
Petroleum and Coal Products 
Manufacturing 
0.25                   73   0.05  -1117.6  ***  0.023  -1.05  *** 
   (147.2) (0.031)  (0.17) 
Fabricated Metal Product 
Manufacturing 
0.17              1,677   1.75  1226.2  ***  -0.472  ***  0.00 
   (237.8) (0.101)  (0.05) 
Printing and Related Support 
Activities 
0.15                 794   0.50  67.6  0.202  ***  0.37  *** 
   (59.6) (0.036)  (0.05) 
Textile Product Mills  0.15                 108   0.07  -911.1  ***  0.125  ***  0.54  *** 
     (121.6) (0.029)  (0.09) 
Food Manufacturing  0.13              1,141   1.08  466.7  ***  0.057  0.04 
     (124.1) (0.148)  (0.09) 
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, 
and Component Manufacturing 
0.11                 364   0.23  -465.3  ***  0.183  ***  0.01 
   (92.0) (0.031)  (0.07) 
Furniture and Related Product 
Manufacturing 
0.09                 463   0.47  -502.9  ***  -0.207  ***  0.05 
   (66.7) (0.078)  (0.06) 
Leather and Allied Product 
Manufacturing 
0.08                   19   0.01  -1096.6  ***  0.108  ***  1.05  *** 
   (153.7) (0.034)  (0.18) 
Machinery Manufacturing  0.07              1,156   1.07  -41.6  -0.301  ***  -0.28  *** 
     (95.9) (0.077)  (0.06) 
Apparel Manufacturing  0.07                 325   0.15  561.4  ***  0.258  ***  1.06  *** 
     (209.1) (0.044)  (0.16) 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing  0.06                 723   0.45  755.3  ***  0.520  ***  0.83  *** 
     (86.0) (0.045)  (0.06)   
Beverage and Tobacco Product 
Manufacturing 
0.05                   95   0.05  -1005.9  ***  0.152  ***  0.00 
   (156.2) (0.056)  (0.20) 
Transportation Equipment 
Manufacturing 
0.05              1,366   0.99  -86.6  -0.627  ***  -0.92  *** 
   (236.0) (0.099)  (0.10) 
Computer and Electronic Product 
Manufacturing 
0.00              1,452   0.62  2749.8  ***  0.848  ***  0.46  *** 
   (378.8) (0.087)  (0.09) 
Total  13,047 10.86                   
* Notes: For each industry, we ran the main regressions separately (except for the industry interaction variables, like electricity intensity and 
LK*Right, which cannot be identified). 
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MSA Only  Full Sample  County FE  State FE 
1     2     3     4    
 
Ln  Electricity  Price  227.0 ***  128.2 ***  414.3 ***  21.6 
 (55.8)  (19.1)  (52.0)  (128.1) 
Ln  P  *  Electricity  Index  -1487.5 ***  -622.4 ***  -1482.4 ***  -1471.0 *** 
  (189.1)  (72.2) (189.1) (190.2) 
Right to Work* 
Labor/Capital  7057.1 ***  2776.8 ***  7029.5 ***  7135.1 *** 
  (1013.0)  (318.0) (1012.5) (1096.3) 
PM Nonattainment County  276.1 ***  111.1 ***  370.7 ***  357.3 *** 
  (99.2)  (42.5) (89.6) (97.6) 
High PM * Nonattainment 
County  -702.4 ***  -398.8 ***  -696.9 ***  -699.8 *** 
  (212.5)  (124.0) (212.7) (212.3) 
No PM Monitor  -8.7  -27.8 **  -33.0 **  28.3 
  (25.1)  (12.7) (14.7) (35.6) 
High PM * No Monitor  259.0 ***  216.5 ***  261.2 ***  259.8 *** 
  (22.5)  (14.0) (22.5) (22.6) 
Other Controls  Y  Y  Y 
County Pair F.E.  Y  Y 
Industry*Year  F.E.  Y  Y Y Y 
State F.E.  Y  Y  Y 
County F.E.  Y 
Cubic function pollution 
concentration 
Y    Y   Y   Y 
R
2  0.36  0.35 0.38 0.33 
Counties  763 3158 763 763 
n  842,106     3,395,899     137,326     137,314    
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors clustered by utility-year.  
The omitted category is a particulate matter attainment county in a non-Right-to-Work state for an industry with a 
low particulate matter emissions factor. 
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Table 6: Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions 
N (Mnfct  Percent 
Employees)  Total Emp  ln N  ln (N+1)  Any N 
1     2     3     4     5    
ln Electricity Price  90.4  0.07  **  0.22  ***  0.06  -0.01 
 (75.6)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.09)  (0.01) 
ln Price * Electricity Index  -1591.6  ***  -0.23  ***  -0.97  ***  -0.55  ***  -0.02 
 (227.9)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.21)  (0.03) 
Right  to  Work*  Labor/Capital  6749.2 ***  6.80 ***  2.02  16.66 ***  2.72 *** 
 (1030.9)  (1.12)  (1.41)  (1.49)  (0.22) 
                 
Other Controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
County Pair F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry-Year F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State F.E.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                 
R
2 0.19  0.11  0.34  0.42  0.36 
N  850,458     850,017     428,502     850,458     850,458    
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors clustered by utility-year. We instrument with commercial electricity prices plus its 




Table 7: Simulation of Carbon Policy 
 
Panel A: Regional Electricity Markets Average and Marginal Carbon Dioxide Emissions per 
MWh from 1997 to 2000. 
NERC Average  Marginal  s.e.   
ECAR 1.038  0.879  (0.019) *** 
MAIN 0.754  0.794  (0.014) *** 
MAPP 1.150  0.791  (0.028) *** 
NPCC 0.472  0.706  (0.018) *** 
SPP 0.889  0.670  (0.026) *** 
SERC 0.759  0.613  (0.019) *** 
FRCC 0.559  0.598  (0.022) *** 
MAAC 0.516 0.580  (0.025) *** 
ERCOT 0.693 0.576  (0.010) *** 
WSCC 0.351  0.234  (0.014) *** 
 
Panel B: Simulation of Carbon Policy ($15/ton of CO2) by State 
State demp  Index  ΔPrice 
Ohio    -11,864  0.30   $      0.013  
Pennsylvania    -10,103  0.30   $      0.010  
New York   -4,752  0.28   $      0.011  
North Carolina   -7,189  0.30   $      0.009  
New Jersey   -4,355  0.29   $      0.009  
Indiana    -6,030  0.29   $      0.013  
Michigan    -7,080  0.28   $      0.013  
Tennessee    -4,202  0.29   $      0.010  
Illinois    -4,877  0.29   $      0.012  
Wisconsin    -5,541  0.30   $      0.012  
Missouri    -4,133  0.27   $      0.011  
Texas    -5,213  0.27   $      0.009  
South Carolina   -3,544  0.29   $      0.009  
Georgia    -3,387  0.27   $      0.009  
Alabama    -3,083  0.27   $      0.009  
Minnesota    -2,877  0.25   $      0.012  
Massachusetts    -2,293  0.30   $      0.011  
Florida    -2,725  0.24   $      0.009  
California    -2,016  0.25   $      0.004  
Maryland    -1,219  0.26   $      0.011  
Colorado    -1,091  0.26   $      0.004  
Washington    -1,411  0.26   $      0.004  
Kentucky    -1,321  0.31   $      0.013  
Connecticut    -1,026  0.27   $      0.011  
Nebraska    -828  0.29   $      0.012  
State demp  Index  ΔPrice 
Arkansas    -951  0.30   $      0.009  
Oregon    -938  0.26   $      0.004  
Kansas    -467  0.26   $      0.010  
South Dakota   -423  0.26   $      0.008  
Rhode Island   -399  0.29   $      0.011  
Oklahoma    -528  0.27   $      0.010  
New Hampshire   -464  0.29   $      0.011  
Mississippi    -350  0.30   $      0.009  
Utah    -459  0.24   $      0.004  
Nevada    -164  0.28   $      0.004  
Arizona    -219  0.28   $      0.004  
Delaware    -137  0.26   $      0.009  
Maine    -193  0.27   $      0.009  
New Mexico   -88  0.24   $      0.004  
Idaho    -49  0.26   $      0.004  
District of Columbia  0  0.16   $      0.009  
Wyoming    -2  0.26   $      0.004  
Montana    12  0.24   $      0.004  
Vermont    201  0.22   $      0.011  
Louisiana    -160  0.26   $      0.009  
North Dakota   338  0.22   $      0.012  
Iowa    288  0.27   $      0.012  
West Virginia   1,735  0.36   $      0.013  
Virginia    2,396  0.25   $      0.010  i 
 
Table A1: Environmental Policies and Percent Total Employment  
No Reg Dis  No Reg Dis 
MSA Only  Full Sample  County FE  State FE 
1     2     3     4    
 
Ln Electricity Price  0.124  ***  0.094  ***  0.133  ***  0.120  *** 
  (0.023)  (0.016) (0.023) (0.034) 
Ln P * Electricity Index  -0.402  ***  -0.262  ***  -0.399  ***  -0.403  *** 
  (0.067)  (0.046) (0.068) (0.067) 
Right  *  Labor/Capital  7.040 ***  6.084 ***  7.079 ***  7.079 *** 
  (1.121)  (0.631) (1.126) (1.172) 
PM Nonattainment County  -0.041 ***  -0.073 ***  -0.012  0.010 
  (0.011)  (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) 
High PM * Nonattain  0.187 ***  0.292 ***  0.188 ***  0.187 *** 
  (0.065)  (0.054) (0.065) (0.065) 
No PM Monitor  0.004 0.008  -0.001  0.050  *** 
  (0.009)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) 
High PM * No Monitor  -0.033 **  0.070 ***  -0.033 **  -0.034 ** 
  (0.016)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
Other Controls  Y  Y  Y 
County Pair F.E.  Y  Y 
Industry*Year  F.E.  Y  Y Y Y 
State F.E.  Y  Y  Y 
County F.E.  Y 
Cubic f'n pollution conc  Y  Y Y Y 
R
2  0.17  0.10 0.17 0.12 
Counties  763 3158 763 763 
n  841,665     3,384,496     137,179     137,167    
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors clustered by utility-year. 
  ii 
 
Table A2: Environmental Policies and Log Manufacturing Employment  
No Reg Dis  No Reg Dis 
MSA Only  Full Sample  County FE  State FE 
1     2     3     4    
 
Ln Electricity Price  0.27  ***  0.31  ***  0.33  ***  0.27  *** 
  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) 
Ln P * Electricity Index  -1.14  ***  -1.21  ***  -1.14  ***  -1.21  *** 
  (0.09)  (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Right  *  Labor/Capital  2.47 *  6.14 ***  2.70 *  1.99 
  (1.40)  (1.17) (1.41) (1.56) 
PM Nonattainment County  0.12 ***  0.09 ***  0.05 **  0.16 *** 
  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
High PM * Nonattain  0.15 ***  0.20 ***  0.16 ***  0.14 *** 
  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
No PM Monitor  -0.01 -0.02  *  -0.04  ***  0.03 
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
High PM * No Monitor  0.14 ***  0.18 ***  0.14 ***  0.17 *** 
  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other Controls  Y  Y  Y 
County Pair F.E.  Y  Y 
Industry*Year  F.E.  Y  Y Y Y 
State F.E.  Y  Y  Y 
County F.E.  Y 
Cubic f'n pollution conc  Y  Y Y Y 
R
2  0.53  0.50 0.54 0.45 
Counties  755 2497 755 755 
n  424,334     694,826     67,347     67,345    
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors clustered by utility-year. 
  iii 
 
Table A3: Environmental Policies and Any Manufacturing Employment  
No Reg Dis  No Reg Dis 
MSA Only  Full Sample  County FE  State FE 
1     2     3     4    
 
Ln Electricity Price  0.01  0.03  ***  0.02  *  0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ln P * Electricity Index  -0.06  **  -0.08  ***  -0.06  **  -0.06  ** 
  (0.03)  (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Right  *  Labor/Capital  2.74 ***  0.83 ***  2.76 ***  2.77 *** 
  (0.23)  (0.13) (0.23) (0.24) 
PM Nonattainment County  -0.01 *  -0.02 ***  0.00  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
High PM * Nonattain  0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No PM Monitor  0.01 -0.02  ***  0.01 0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
High PM * No Monitor  -0.01 **  -0.02 ***  -0.01 **  -0.01 ** 
  (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Other Controls  Y  Y  Y 
County Pair F.E.  Y  Y 
Industry*Year  F.E.  Y  Y Y Y 
State F.E.  Y  Y  Y 
County F.E.  Y 
Cubic f'n pollution conc  Y  Y Y Y 
R
2  0.50  0.44 0.51 0.46 
Counties  763 3158 763 763 
n  842,106     3,395,899     137,326     137,314    
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors clustered by utility-year. 
 